One Year Later: Evaluating The New Power Game in Light of the Facts
- IBG Legal Law Firm

- Mar 6
- 7 min read
ANALYSIS | GEOPOLITICS, TECHNOLOGY & FINANCE
By Enrique Benet-Gregg | January 2026
Available on Amazon: English Version | Spanish Version
In March 2025, I published The New Power Game: Technology, Money and Geopolitics in 2025, an attempt to map the forces reshaping the international order. One year later, with the advantage of hindsight, it is time to subject that analysis to the scrutiny of facts. Not as an exercise in self-congratulation, but as intellectual discipline: anyone who claims to anticipate trends must be accountable when reality delivers its verdict.
This exercise serves an additional purpose. I am currently preparing the continuation of that work, and any projection toward 2026-2030 must start from an honest assessment of what worked and what did not in the previous analysis. The credibility of future forecasts depends on transparency about the past.
I. The Analytical Framework: What I Set Out to Do
The New Power Game proceeded from a central premise: we are witnessing not a cyclical rearrangement of global power, but a structural reconfiguration where technology, finance, and geopolitics converge in unprecedented ways. The book identified seven analytical axes I considered determinant for 2025: the tariff and trade policy of the second Trump administration; the evolution of the Ukraine-Russia conflict under U.S. diplomatic pressure; tensions in the South China Sea as a barometer of Sino-American rivalry; the nearshoring phenomenon and supply chain reconfiguration toward Mexico; the expansion of the digital yuan as an instrument of Chinese financial autonomy; the maturation of the crypto ecosystem under a transformed regulatory framework; and the AI revolution and its impact on labor markets and social structures.
II. Tariffs and Trade War: IEEPA as a Weapon
What I anticipated: In February 2025, when I wrote the chapter on the Trump 2.0 administration, I noted that the president had threatened 25% tariffs on Mexican products and would likely resort to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to justify measures that would otherwise require congressional approval.
What happened: Reality exceeded projections in scale, though not in direction. In February 2025, Trump effectively imposed 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico, plus 10% on China, invoking IEEPA to impose tariffs for the first time in history. But April brought what no one anticipated precisely: Liberation Day, when Trump announced reciprocal tariffs on virtually every country in the world. The escalation with China reached extreme levels — 145% from the United States, 125% in Chinese retaliation.
Assessment: I was correct on three fundamental aspects: the unprecedented use of IEEPA, the initial 25% level on Mexico, and the transactional nature of subsequent negotiations. I underestimated the administration's audacity in extending tariffs globally. Liberation Day represented a qualitative leap that did not figure in my scenarios.
III. Ukraine-Russia: More Diplomatic Progress Than Expected
What I anticipated: I projected that the conflict would enter a phase of strategic stalemate with tactical escalation, and that Trump would push for negotiations that could include de facto recognition of Russian-occupied territories.
What happened: Reality validated the direction but surprised in speed. In April 2025, a 30-hour Easter truce occurred — the first official pause since the invasion began. In August, Trump and Putin met in Alaska. By December, a Trump-Zelenskyy meeting at Mar-a-Lago produced a 20-point peace plan, with the Ukrainian president declaring that 90% was agreed. The emerging terms include 15-year U.S. security guarantees, an 800,000-strong Ukrainian peacetime army, and a timeline for EU accession.
Assessment: The analytical framework worked: military stalemate, Trump's diplomatic pressure, Europeans assuming greater burden. What I underestimated was the administration's willingness to invest real political capital in a negotiated solution. This represents an error of degree, not direction.
IV. South China Sea: Tension as a Constant
What I anticipated: The book's analysis predicted that Sino-Philippine friction would intensify significantly, that the Mutual Defense Treaty would be invoked, and that ASEAN would fracture in its response.
What happened: The escalation indeed materialized. In August 2025, a Chinese coast guard vessel collided with a Chinese Navy destroyer while harassing a Philippine patrol near Scarborough — an incident that resulted in Chinese casualties. Subsequent months brought China declaring Scarborough Shoal a national nature reserve, installing floating barriers, and deploying unmanned buoys. The statistics are telling: 47 documented incidents in 2025 through mid-October, within a total of 245 since 2022.
Assessment: The structural thesis held: sustained escalation, treaty invocation, ASEAN division, U.S. naval deployment. This underscores a methodological point: trajectory analysis captures directional trends more reliably than discrete events.
V. Nearshoring Mexico: Between Opportunity and Structural Constraints
What I anticipated: I identified nearshoring as a historic opportunity for Mexico, projecting more than $53 billion in foreign direct investment between 2023 and 2025. I also warned of structural limitations: energy infrastructure deficits, insecurity in logistics corridors, and insufficient specialized workforce training.
What happened: The 2025 data validated the opportunity thesis. Between January and September 2025, Mexico captured $40.9 billion in FDI, a 14.5% increase. The first quarter registered a historic record of $21.4 billion. Mexico maintained its position as the United States' number one trading partner for nine consecutive months. However, the structural constraints persisted: energy deficits, security deterioration (extortion of transport companies increased 23% year-over-year), and water crisis affecting northern manufacturing states.
Assessment: This was among the book's more nuanced predictions — correctly identifying both the magnitude of the opportunity and the structural constraints that could limit its realization. The question I posed remains unanswered: can Mexico convert this capital flow into sustainable development, or will infrastructure and institutional deficiencies ultimately divert investments toward competitors?
VI. Digital Yuan: Exceeding Expectations
What I anticipated: I projected that the digital yuan (e-CNY) would process approximately one trillion dollars in transactions.
What happened: Reality exceeded projections in speed and scale. By November 2025, the e-CNY had processed 16.7 trillion yuan — equivalent to $2.38 trillion — an 800% increase from 2023. The mBridge platform processed $55.49 billion, a 2,500-fold increase since 2022, with 95% of transactions denominated in e-yuan.
Assessment: I underestimated the speed of digital yuan expansion. This does not invalidate the analysis — the direction was correct — but actual figures doubled projections. The methodological lesson: when analyzing Chinese state policy, it is preferable to err by excess rather than by default.
VII. Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies: Precise Prediction
What I anticipated: I noted that Bitcoin would surpass $100,000, that the Trump administration would implement a favorable regulatory framework, and that institutional integration would accelerate through ETFs.
What happened: Bitcoin crossed $100,000 on December 5, 2024, reaching $103,679. The all-time high came on October 6, 2025: $126,210.50. Bitcoin ETFs recorded record flows: $753 million in January 2026, $1.18 billion in July 2025.
Assessment: This prediction was fulfilled with notable precision. The structural factors I identified — ETF approvals, Trump's pro-crypto stance, institutional demand — operated as projected.
VIII. The AI Revolution: A Slower Disruption Than Anticipated
What I anticipated: The book projected that AI and automation would create approximately 170 million new jobs globally by the end of the decade while displacing around 92 million — a net gain of 78 million, but with significant transitional disruption.
What happened: The AI landscape of 2025 evolved differently than the most dramatic projections suggested. Adoption was broad but integration was uneven. Generative AI tools achieved near-universal awareness, but deep operational integration proceeded more slowly. Most organizations remained in pilot or augmentation phases rather than wholesale automation. Labor displacement was real but not catastrophic.
Assessment: The book's AI analysis was directionally sound but temporally optimistic. The transformation I described is occurring, but on a longer timeline. AI in 2025 proved to be more of a productivity enhancer than a job eliminator — at least so far. This is a reminder that technological adoption follows S-curves: slow initial uptake, rapid acceleration, then gradual saturation. We may be at the inflection point rather than the plateau.
IX. Overall Balance: A Framework That Held
Evaluating the seven analytical axes together, the multidimensional framework I proposed — the convergence of technology, finance, and geopolitics — correctly captured the fundamental dynamics of 2025.
What worked: Bitcoin crossing $100,000 and institutional crypto adoption; the nearshoring boom in Mexico with record FDI; the unprecedented use of IEEPA for tariffs; sustained escalation in the South China Sea; accelerated expansion of the digital yuan; military stalemate in Ukraine combined with diplomatic pressure.
What failed or required adjustment: The magnitude of China-U.S. tariffs exceeded projections. The global Liberation Day tariffs were not in my scenarios. Diplomatic progress in Ukraine was more substantial than anticipated. AI-driven labor disruption proceeded more gradually.
Methodological lessons: First, Trump's policy is more unpredictable in tactics but more predictable in strategic direction. Second, China executes faster than external observers project. Third, structural trends are more robust than discrete events — getting the trajectory right matters more than getting the precise timing right.
X. The Future Looks Like the Past — But Faster
The 2025 analysis of The New Game of Power reveals both the strengths and limits of forecasting in an interconnected world. The framework — built on recognizing the intersection of technological disruption, financial architecture, and geopolitical realignment — proved remarkably resilient. Its emphasis on structural forces over episodic events enabled directional accuracy even when specific timings or magnitudes diverged from projections.
Moving forward, the key insight is not to predict with false precision, but to understand the vectors of change. The transition from unipolar to multipolar power continues; AI integration accelerates despite measured adoption curves; financial systems digitize with uneven regulatory responses; climate pressures intensify without proportional policy action. The acceleration is real, even if the timeline remains uncertain.
XI. Conclusion
One year after publication, The New Game of Power demonstrates that rigorous analytical frameworks can navigate uncertainty without succumbing to it. While no forecast is perfect, the book's core thesis — that power dynamics are being fundamentally restructured by the convergence of technology, finance, and geopolitics — has been validated by events.
The real test of strategic analysis is not whether every prediction materializes exactly as forecast, but whether the framework remains useful for navigating an evolving landscape. By that measure, the book succeeds. The game of power continues to evolve, but the rules identified remain in play. Understanding those rules — and adapting to their evolution — remains the task ahead.
Enrique Benet-Gregg is an attorney, entrepreneur and author. He directs IBG Legal, a boutique law firm specializing in foreign investment, real estate, and corporate law with offices in Cancún and Mexico City. The New Power Game is available on Amazon in English and Spanish. info@ibg.legal | ibg.legal




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